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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2008, Congress enacted the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction
Act1 ("DTVIA") as part of its efforts to decrease the trafficking of drugs
* Articles and Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate, May
2013, University of Miami School of Law; B.S. 2009, DePaul University Driehaus College of
Business.
1. 22 U.S.C. § 2285 (Supp. II 2008). The statute provides in relevant part,
(a) Offense - Whoever knowingly operates, or attempts or conspires to operate, by
any means, or embarks in any submersible vessel or semi-submersible vessel that is
without nationality and that is navigating or has navigated into, through, or from
waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of any single country or a lateral
limit of that country's territorial sea with an adjacent country, with the intent to
evade detection, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years,
or both....
(c) Extraterritorial jurisdiction - There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an
offense under this section, including an attempt or conspiracy to commit such an
offense.
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into the United States. The DTVIA asserts extraterritorial jurisdiction
over stateless semisubmersible and submersible vessels attempting to
evade detection on the high seas, irrespective of the contents of the ves-
sel. This article argues that the DTVIA represents a departure from prior
assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction; that enactment of the statute
exceeds congressional power and pushes the boundaries of international
law; and that the DTVIA further presents potentially negative long-term
effects. Overall, the DTVIA demonstrates an overzealous reach of
United States jurisdiction on the high seas.
First, this article will explain the purpose and background of the
Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act of 2008. Then it will discuss
the statutes and treaties leading up to its enactment, while including the
related case law analyzing their constitutionality. To date, all litigation
surrounding the constitutionality of the DTVIA has occurred within the
Eleventh Circuit. Thus, the article will examine the Eleventh Circuit's
analysis of the DTVIA in light of challenges to its constitutionality.
Finally, that section and the article will conclude explaining why the Act
exceeds congressional power and is inconsistent with principles of inter-
national law.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE DRUG TRAFFICKING VESSEL INTERDICTION
ACT OF 2008
In recent decades, the United States has launched a war on the drug
trade. Despite the government's efforts, millions of dollars' worth of
drugs enter the country every year. The United States Coast Guard has
played a critical role in seizing drugs both within and outside the territo-
rial waters of the United States. The Coast Guard has made drug-related
seizures of thirty-one, forty, fifty-six, and fifty-eight vessels in 2012,
2011, 2010, and 2009, respectively.2 These events led to the detention of
over 750 people and the forfeiture of over one million pounds of mari-
juana and cocaine.3 The Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act of
2008 was enacted in response to the growing problem of drug traffickers
transporting large quantities of cocaine and other drugs to the United
States and Mexico, specifically in self-propelled semi-submersible ves-
sels.4 The use of semi-submersible vessels has become a common
method of smuggling drugs because the semi-submersible vessels are
designed to readily sink upon detection. 5 When crewmembers of the
2. Coast Guard Drug Removal Statistics, U.S. COAST GUARD OFFICE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
CG-531, http://www.uscg.mi1/hq/cg5/cg531/Drugs/stats.asp (last visited Aug. 24, 2012).
3. Id.
4. 154 Cong. Rec. H10,252 (2008).
5. See Brian Wilson, Submersibles and Transnational Criminal Organizations, 17 OCEAN &
COASTAL L.J. 35 (2011).
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vessels suspect detection by law enforcement, they quickly scuttle the
contents of the vessel into the ocean and sink the submarine. The vessels
are financed by massive drug cartels, who even factor in that a certain
percentage of the drugs will be seized by law enforcement as a sort of
cost of doing business.6
The vessels, typically constructed in the jungles of Ecuador and
Columbia, are less than one-hundred feet in length.' Semi-submersible
vessels are similar to submarines, except they typically do not fully sub-
merse, with portions of the vessel remaining at or near the water's sur-
face.8 The vessels can carry crews of four to five people traveling up to
5,000 miles without refueling. 9 Prior to the enactment of the DTVIA, the
Coast Guard needed to have evidence of drugs in order to obtain a con-
viction following a seizure-a difficult burden to meet. Such a vessel
design makes interception of smuggled content by law enforcement
nearly impossible because crewmembers can quickly dispose of cargo
and jump overboard. Thus, in an effort to curtail drug smuggling by
these vessels, Congress enacted the DTVIA to criminalize the mere act
of operating a vessel without a national registration on the high seas
while attempting to evade detection. Congress also suggested further
applicability to combat the use of these vessels beyond drug smuggling
to the transportation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorists.10
Im. PREDECESSOR STATUTES AND RELATED TREATIES
A. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention Act
The DTVIA presents a broad jurisdictional leap taken by the United
States on the high seas; however, prior assertions of jurisdiction by fed-
eral courts over stateless vessels" paved the way for the statute's enact-
ment. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970 ("the 1970 Act") provided for the prosecution of various drug
6. Deborah Feyerick et al., Drug Smugglers Becoming More Creative, U.S. Agents Say,
CNN.coM (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/04/16/creaive.drug.smugglers/
index.html.




10. 154 Cong. Rec. H10,253.
11. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which the United States is not a
signatory, defines a ship without nationality as one that flies the flag of no nation or one that flies
the flags of two nations, choosing which to sail under by convenience. United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea art. 92., para. 2, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
The same definition appears in Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas, the predecessor
treaty, to which the United States was a signatory. United Nations Convention on the High Seas,
Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11, 82 [hereinafter Convention on the High Seas].
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smuggling activities on the high seas. 12 This statute provided for the
prosecution of narcotics possession within the territorial waters of the
United States, and also on the high seas if there was found to be an
intention to distribute within the United States. 3 Under this statute, law
enforcement did not have the ability to convict for possession of mari-
juana by vessels on the high seas, even those registered to the United
States, unless it was proven that there was an intention to distribute
within the United States.14 The burden of proof under the 1970 Act
made convictions of those aboard vessels apprehended on the high seas
difficult, regardless of whether the vessels were stateless; in this way,
the Coast Guard's ability to combat drug smuggling to the territorial
waters of the United States was limited.
B. The Marijuana on the High Seas Act of 1980
In 1980, Congress enacted the Marijuana on the High Seas Act 15 to
broaden the scope of the 1970 Act. 16 This statute provides for the prose-
cution of persons in possession of a controlled substance on board any
vessel or aircraft arriving or departing from the United States. 17 At the
time of that statute's enactment, the United States was party to the Con-
vention on the High Seas.' 8 Many courts expressly relied on this treaty
to apply the statute to stateless vessels on the high seas stating that juris-
diction extends to vessels including those "without a nationality or a
vessel assimilated to a vessel without a nationality, in accordance with
paragraph (2) of article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas, 1958."'
Under this statute Congress intended to "prohibit all acts of illicit traf-
ficking in controlled substances on the high seas in which the United
12. 84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
13. Id.
14. United States v. Hayes, 653 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1981).
15. 21 U.S.C. §§ 955a-955d (1982). The Act has been transferred and consolidated to 21
U.S.C. § 955 (2006).
16. For a more detailed analysis of the Marijuana on the High Seas Act of 1980 and its
history, see Laura L. Roos, Stateless Vessels and the High Seas Narcotics Trade: United States
Courts Deviate from International Principles of Jurisdiction, 9 MAR. LAw. 273 (1984).
17. Id.
18. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 11.
19. 21 U.S.C. § 955b(d) (1982). Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas provides,
1. Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases
expressly provided for in international treaties or in these articles, shall be subject to
its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas. A ship may not change its flag during a
voyage or while in a port of call, save in the case of a real transfer of ownership or
change of registry.
2. A ship which sails under the flags of two or more States, using them according to
convenience, may not claim any of the nationalities in question with respect to any
other State, and may be assimilated to a ship without nationality.
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States can reach under international law."' 2' The Act made it unlawful to
"knowingly or intentionally manufacture or distribute, or to possess with
intent to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance. 21 Unlike the
1970 Act, however, the Marijuana on the High Seas Act did not require
an intention to distribute within the United States, giving a broader reach
to law enforcement. Congress explicitly intended the Marijuana on the
High Seas Act to have extraterritorial effect.2 3 By extending jurisdiction
of the statute to stateless vessels extraterritorially, Congress did not
explicitly require any nexus between activity on the high seas and activ-
ity within the United States. Nonetheless, based on congressional intent,
courts should interpret the extraterritorial jurisdictional application of
this statute as limited by principles of international law.24 While courts
have been inconsistent in such interpretation, most have instituted a
nexus requirement with the United States for prosecution under this
statute.25
In the Eleventh Circuit's landmark case on the nexus issue, United
States v. Marino-Garcia,26 the court tackled the question of whether
international law imposes any substantive restrictions upon extending
criminal jurisdiction to all crewmembers of stateless vessels on the high
seas engaged in the distribution of controlled substances under the Mari-
juana on the High Seas Act. The court held that there was no such impo-
sition, explaining that jurisdiction "exists solely as a consequence of the
vessel's status as stateless."2 The court explained that vessels "without
nationality are international pariahs. They have no internationally recog-
nized right to navigate freely on the High Seas."28 The court noted that
under the principle of freedom of the seas, "international law generally
prohibits any country from asserting jurisdiction over foreign vessels on
20. United States v. Gonzales, 776 F.2d 931, 933 (1985).
21. 21 U.S.C. § 955a(a) (1982). The statute defines controlled substances as those contained
in Schedules I-IV of the Controlled Substance Act, currently found at 21 C.F.R. § 1308. This
means that the statute only applies to substances controlled in the United States.
22. 21 U.S.C. § 955a(a).
23. 21 U.S.C. § 955a(h) (1982). This section states,
(h) Extension beyond territorial jurisdiction of the United States: This section is
intended to reach acts of possession, manufacture, or distribution committed outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
24. See Gonzales, 776 F.2d at 933; see also, Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64, 117 (1804) (Chief Justice Marshall explaining that "an act of congress ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains").
25. See, e.g., United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1981)
(explaining that "[s]ome manner of nexus with some interest of the United States is essential to
give this Court subject matter jurisdiction over any prosecution for possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute").
26. 670 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982).
27. Id. at 1383.
28. Id. at 1382.
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the high seas," but that such an idea does not extend to stateless ves-
sels. 29 British courts have reached similar conclusions about stateless
vessels.3°
On the high seas, the court explained, jurisdiction will also lie over
foreign vessels if there is a nexus between the foreign vessel and the
nation seeking to assert jurisdiction, if the foreign vessel threatens
national security or governmental functions, or if the foreign vessel is
engaged in activity universally prohibited, such as the slave trade or
piracy. 3 The court concluded that these jurisdictional requirements
apply only to foreign vessels, and not stateless vessels.32
In reaching these conclusions, the Eleventh Circuit relied in part on
Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas. 33 United States v. Marino-
Garcia was decided on July 9, 1982. That same year, the Convention on
the High Seas, which the United States ratified in 1958, was superseded
by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS").3 4 UNCLOS was the international agreement resulting
from the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea that took
place between 1973 and 1982.3' The Convention was opened for signa-
ture soon after the Marino-Garcia case on December 10, 1982.36
Although 157 countries have signed the treaty to date, the United States
has neither signed nor ratified the UNCLOS.3 7 The United States' failure
to adopt the new treaty plays a critical role in the analysis of the DTVIA
because courts interpreting the DTVIA rely on Marino-Garcia, which is
supported by a treaty that is no longer in force. 8 Moreover, the United
States' political stance toward the new treaty poses a tricky situation for
the courts.39
C. The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act of 1986
The next large piece of maritime drug trafficking legislation
occurred when the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act ("MDLEA")
29. Id. at 1381.
30. See, e.g., Molvan v. Attorney-General for Palestine, A.C. 351 (1948) (explaining that no
"question of comity nor any breach of international law can arise, if there is no State under whose
flag the vessel sails").
31. Marino-Garcia, 670 F.2d at 1381-82.
32. Id.
33. Id.; see also Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas, supra note 19.
34. UNCLOS, supra note 11.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN.oRG, http://
www.un.orglDeptsllos/reference-files/status2OlO.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2012).
38. See infra, Part IV-C.
39. Id.
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was enacted in 1986.40 For the twenty years leading up to the enactment
of the DTVIA, the United States prosecuted maritime drug offenses pri-
marily through the MDLEA. The MDLEA makes it illegal for an indi-
vidual to "knowingly or intentionally manufacture or distribute, or
possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance
on board ... a vessel of the United States or a vessel subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States."4 The statute includes stateless vessels
as those subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.4 2 Despite the
MDLEA being enacted after the UNCLOS treaty was ratified by more
than 130 countries, the MDLEA references the definition of stateless
vessel from Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas.4 3
The MDLEA gave the authority needed to pursue a multitude of
convictions in the United States' ongoing efforts to combat the interna-
tional drug trade.' The statute cannot reach foreign vessels on the high
seas because these vessels are subject to the jurisdiction of the nation to
which they are registered.45 By flying flags of convenience, vessels are
able to escape the statutory reach of the MDLEA.46 Still, numerous
bilateral and multilateral treaties allow the United States Coast Guard to
stop, board, and search suspicious vessels.4 7 These treaties have greatly
expanded the reach of the United States' drug interdiction efforts.4,
Even with its broad reach, the MDLEA faces jurisdictional obsta-
cles because some courts still impose a nexus requirement despite the
presence of a bilateral agreement. The Supreme Court has yet to rule on
the issue of whether there must be a nexus between a foreign vessel on
the high seas and the United States under the MDLEA for United States
courts to obtain jurisdiction. In the circuit courts, there is currently a
split on this issue. The Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, Fifth, and
Eleventh Circuits do not impose such a nexus requirement.4 9 Con-
40. 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501-70507 (1986).
41. Id. at § 70503(a).
42. Id. at § 70502(c).
43. Id. at § 70502(c)(1)(B).
44. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT VOLUME
I: DRUG AND CHEMICAL CONTROL 48 (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/1 56575.pdf [hereinafter NARCOTICS REPORT].
45. Id.
46. Flying a flag of convenience is the practice of registering a ship under a foreign country's
flag in order to be governed by the laws of that country. See Lindo v. NCL, Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257
(11th Cir. 2011).
47. See NARCOTICS REPORT, supra note 44.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Angulo-Hernandez, 565 F.3d 2, 11 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that
the government was not required, under due process, to prove a nexus between the defendant's
conduct and the United States under the MDLEA); see also United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d
2012]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
versely, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals requires both constitutional
jurisdiction and statutory jurisdiction.
According to the Ninth Circuit, a showing of a nexus between the
vessel and the nation satisfies constitutional jurisdiction. Meeting any of
the elements of the MDLEA satisfies statutory jurisdiction.50 For exam-
ple, in United States v. Perlaza, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that the United States Coast Guard did not have jurisdiction
over crewmembers found in possession of narcotics on the high seas
absent a showing of a nexus between their activity and the United
States .5 The court reached this conclusion even though the Coast Guard
obtained permission to board the vessel based on an agreement between
the United States and Colombia."2 Still, although the Ninth Circuit
imposes a nexus requirement, the court accepts a very loose definition of
nexus. This point was illustrated in United States v. Medjuck, where
nexus was established by a finding that smuggled narcotics, although not
heading for the United States, would eventually end up in the United
States. 53
With the increasing use of stateless vessels as a method to transport
drugs, the debate over the MDLEA's nexus requirement may soon
become irrelevant. Flying a flag of convenience may be a method to
avoid prosecution under the MDLEA in some courts, but there is no
such requirement as applied to stateless vessels because the MDLEA
provides for jurisdiction over stateless vessels on the high seas.54 Still,
evidence of knowledge of or intent to "manufacture or distribute, or pos-
sess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance on
board must be found" to satisfy the elements of the crime against both
foreign and stateless vessels under the MDLEA.55 Because of the trend
1320 (1 1th Cir. 2003); United States v. Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d 400 (3d Cir. 2002); United States
v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 36 (5th Cir. 2002).
50. 46 U.S.C. § 70502 (1980). This section explains that a "vessel subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States" includes
(A) a vessel without nationality;
(B) a vessel assimilated to a vessel without nationality under paragraph (2) of article
6 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas;
(C) a vessel registered in a foreign nation if that nation has consented or waived
objection to the enforcement of United States law by the United States;
(D) a vessel in the customs waters of the United States;
(E) a vessel in the territorial waters of a foreign nation if the nation consents to the
enforcement of United States law by the United States.
51. United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2006).
52. Id.
53. United States v. Medjuck, 156 F.3d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining "both economics
and geography dictate that that at least some portion of the [drugs] would at some point be found
in the United States").
54. See, e.g., United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320 (1 th Cir. 2003).
55. 46 U.S.C. § 70503 (1986).
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of using semi-submersible vessels to transport drugs through interna-
tional waters, the MDLEA becomes ineffective if smugglers can quickly
scuttle illegal cargo and sink the vessel before evidence is obtained.
Prior to the enactment of the DTVIA, Coast Guard officials complained
that they were being forced to release crewmembers of stopped vessels
because all of the evidence was at the bottom of the ocean.56 The
DTVIA eliminates that evidentiary burden by creating a federal offense
for the mere act of operating a submersible or semi-submersible vessel
without nationality with the intent to evade detection.57 The DTVIA
cross-references a portion of the MDLEA that lists a number of factors
to be taken as prima facie evidence of the intent to evade detection,
many of which are characteristic of all semi-submersible vessels.5 8
IV. ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS OF THE DTVIA
To date, challenges to the DTVIA have been litigated primarily
within the Eleventh Circuit. Those prosecuted under the statute have
unsuccessfully challenged the statute from many angles. The Eleventh
Circuit has rejected all such challenges, ruling that the statute does not
exceed Congress' Article I, section 8 powers, that the statute is not
unconstitutionally vague, that it does not impermissibly shift the burden
of proof to the defendants, and that the statute does not violate substan-
tive due process.59 Challenges have also been made to the sentencing
guidelines associated with the DTVIA. The DTVIA, and particularly the
56. Feyerick, supra note 6, at 2.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 2285 (Supp. II 2008).
58. 46 U.S.C. § 70507 (2006). Such factors include
(I) The construction or adaptation of the vessel in a manner that facilitates
smuggling, including-
(A) the configuration of the vessel to ride low in the water or present a low hull
profile to avoid being detected visually or by radar;
(B) the presence of any compartment or equipment that is built or fitted out for
smuggling, not including items such as a safe or lock-box reasonably used
for the storage of personal valuables; ...
(F) the presence of a camouflaging paint scheme, or of materials used to
camouflage the vessel, to avoid detection; or...
(4) The operation of the vessel without lights during times lights are required to be
displayed under applicable law or regulation and in a manner of navigation
consistent with smuggling tactics used to avoid detection by law enforcement
authorities. ...
(9) The presence of a controlled substance in the water in the vicinity of the vessel,
where given the currents, weather conditions, and course and speed of the
vessel, the quantity or other nature is such that it reasonably indicates
manufacturing or distribution activity.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370 (11 th Cir. 2011), and infra,
Part IV-A. The first argument that the DTVIA exceeds congressional authority will be discussed
separately. See infra note 107, and Part IV-C.
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Eleventh Circuit's analysis of the congressional authority to grant extra-
territorial jurisdiction, presents broader implications in the foreign pol-
icy realm, pushing the boundaries of international law and expanding the
United States' presence in international justice. The cases that follow
demonstrate the problems created by the DTVIA and the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's interpretation of the statute.
A. United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera
The Eleventh Circuit issued its seminal opinion interpreting the
DTVIA in United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera in February of 2011 .60
In January of 2009, the United States Coast Guard received a report
from a Maritime Patrol Aircraft of a suspicious semi-submersible vessel
in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, approximately 163 nautical miles off the
coast of Colombia. 6' The aircraft observed four men exit the vessel,
inflate life rafts, and jump into the water.62  Eventually, the
crewmembers deflated the rafts, and continued their travel.63 When a
Coast Guard ship arrived, the aircraft illuminated the vessel.' The
crewmembers exited the vessel, inflated the life rafts again, and jumped
into the water.65 Aircraft personnel observed a "flash of light" and
"smoke or steam" emit from the vessel, which then sank.66 The
crewmembers were escorted to a Coast Guard ship and flown to Tampa
where they were arrested on January 14, 2009.67 The crewmembers were
charged with violating the DTVIA for the operation of a semi-submersi-
ble vessel in international waters without nationality, and with the intent
to evade detection.68
The defendants in Ibarguen-Mosquera claimed that the terms of the
DTVIA are vague as to violate due process. 69 To be unconstitutionally
vague, phrases in a statute must be vague as applied to the challengers,
and not as applied to other potential offenders.70 The defendants specifi-
cally challenged the phrases "semi-submersible," "vessel," and "intent to
evade."'" Because the terms are defined within the statute, and the activ-
ity of the crewmembers fell within the ordinary meaning of the words,
60. lbarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1370.









70. Id. at 1380 (citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2719 (2010)).
71. Id.
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the Eleventh Circuit easily disposed of this challenge.72 The vessel in
which the defendants were found was within the definition of "semi-
submersible vessel," and the defendants' conduct met more than one of
the prima facie indicators of "intent to evade" as enumerated in the
statute.
73
The defendants additionally argued that the DTVIA violates proce-
dural due process because the statute "effectively redefines the offense
of drug trafficking, eliminating the requirement of drug-possession. 74
They argued that the burden of proof shifts to the defendants because
they would have to raise the element of drug possession, or lack thereof,
as an affirmative defense. The Eleventh Circuit explained that
although the statute was intended to deter drug trafficking, it is not
exclusively a drug trafficking statute.76 Rather, the statute creates an
entirely new offense by criminalizing not only the underlying conduct of
drug trafficking, but also by criminalizing the act of operating a stateless
vessel. 77 Therefore, the court found, there was no procedural due process
violation. The Eleventh Circuit's refusal to classify the statute as a drug
trafficking statute seems to be a convenient justification for defeating
this challenge. This justification becomes inconsistent with the court's
later reliance on the drug trafficking nature of the statute to justify the
sentencing guidelines attached to the DTVIA.
78
Similarly, the defendants further claimed that the DTVIA violates
substantive due process because it is not rationally related to any legiti-
mate government interest.79 The Eleventh Circuit explained that the
rational relation test8 ° is not rigorous and that the government's assertion
that the operation of such vessels is a serious international problem eas-
72. Id. As cross-referenced in the DTVIA, 46 U.S.C. § 70502(f) defines a semi-submersible
vessel as "any watercraft constructed or adapted to be capable of operating with most of its hull
and bulk under the surface of the water, including both manned and unmanned watercraft." A
submersible vessel is one that "is capable of operating completely below the surface of the water,
including both manned and unmanned watercraft." Id.
73. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1380.
74. Id. at 1381.
75. Id.
76. Id. ("While it is probably true that the DTVIA was enacted in part to deal with the
problem of losing drug evidence to the sinking of semi-submersibles, the DTVIA is not a drug-
trafficking statute. In enacting the DTVIA, Congress chose to prohibit an entirely new evil, not to
redefine an old one.")
77. Id.
78. See infra note 88.
79. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1382.
80. This challenge is separate from the challenge that due process is violated by the law being
arbitrary or unfair without a nexus requirement. Although the court's analysis of the rational
relation test appears similar to its analysis of the nexus requirement, the two are distinct issues
considered by the court.
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ily passes muster as a governmental interest.8 The Ibarguen-Mosquera
defendants made several other case-specific challenges, including claims
of insufficient evidence, double jeopardy, and inappropriate exclusion of
expert testimony, all of which were struck down by the court.82
B. Other Cases Challenging the DTVIA
1. UNITED STATES V. SAAC
Although Ibarguen-Mosquera is the seminal Eleventh Circuit case
analyzing the DTVIA, additional issues have been raised in other cases.
United States v. Saac presents four cases consolidated before the Elev-
enth Circuit to challenge the sentencing guidelines associated with the
DTVIA. 3 In the consolidated case, after being charged for operating a
stateless semi-submersible in violation of the DTVIA, defendants
entered unconditional guilty pleas.84 The district court sentenced the
defendants to 108 months' imprisonment and three years of supervised
release for each count, to run concurrently.85 At the time of sentencing,
the district court applied the proposed sentencing guidelines for the
DTVIA, although no offense-specific guideline had been officially
promulgated for the DTVIA.86
In reviewing the district court's sentencing, the Eleventh Circuit
explained that when "no offense specific guideline has been promul-
gated, the district court either must apply the most analogous guideline,
or if there is not a sufficiently analogous guideline, [the baseline sen-
tencing factors] of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 control."87 The Eleventh Circuit
agreed with the district court that there was no sufficiently analogous
guideline, and that because the district court considered section 3553,
the district court committed no procedural error in selecting the
sentences.88 The Eleventh Circuit also analyzed the 108-month sentence
itself, as contained in the proposed guideline, and found that it was not
substantively unreasonable. 89 The sentencing guidelines as applied to
the four defendants achieved the goals of deterring "drug cartels from
using submersible vessels to smuggle drugs," protecting the public, and
providing "proper punishment especially in light of the seriousness of
81. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1382; see also 154 Cong. Rec. H10,252, supra note 4.
82. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1385-86.
83. 632 F.3d 1203 (11 th Cir. 2011).
84. Id. at 1207.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1212. Congress later adopted the proposed DTVIA guidelines that became effective
on November 1, 2009. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2X7.2 (2009).
87. Saac, 632 F.3d at 1213.
88. Id. at 1214.
89. Id. at 1215.
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the offense."9
2. UNITED STATES V. VALAREzo-ORoBiO
Contrary to the facts in Ibarguen-Mosquera, United States v.
Valarezo-Orobio is an example of a prosecution under the DTVIA in
which there were no drugs on board.91 In Valarezo-Orobio, the defend-
ants were crewmembers on a thirty-five-foot self-propelled semi-sub-
mersible vessel that was apprehended by the United States Coast Guard
in international waters near Colombia on July 27, 2009.92 The vessel,
which defendants admitted was semi-submersed to evade detection, was
traveling from Colombia to Ecuador to pick up cargo for a transportation
trip.93 While at sea, defendant Valarezo spotted a maritime patrol heli-
copter and notified the vessel's captain. 94 The captain ordered Valarezo
to inflate a life raft and to sink the vessel by opening four valves. 95 By
the time the Coast Guard arrived, the vessel had completely sunk and all
crewmembers had abandoned the vessel to board the life raft.96 All
crewmembers except for the captain were charged with conspiracy and
substantive violations of the DTVIA. 97 Both Valarezo and his co-defen-
dant Palomino were sentenced to 108 months' imprisonment followed
by thirty-six months of supervised release. 98
On appeal, the defendants challenged the constitutionality of the
DTVIA on the grounds that it exceeds Congress' power to regulate
piracy and crimes on the high seas, that the definitions in the statute are
unconstitutionally vague, and that it violates due process by presuming
that the defendant is guilty of drug trafficking solely upon evidence that
he operated a semi-submersible vessel, thus impermissibly shifting the
burden of proof to the defendant.99 While on appeal, these issues were
disposed of in Ibarguen-Mosquera, and the Eleventh Circuit similarly
denied the challenges.100 The court further analyzed the sentencing
guidelines for the DTVIA, and the enhancement that was applied to the
defendants. The court found that the district court appropriately applied
the sentencing guidelines and the enhancement.10 '
90. Id. at 1214.
91. United States v. Valarezo-Orobio, 635 F.3d 1261 (11 th Cir. 2011).
92. Id. at 1262.
93. Id.





99. Id. at 1263-64.
100. Id. at 1264.
101. Id. at 1265.
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While the constitutional challenges in Valarezo-Orobio to the
DTVIA were similar to those in Ibarguen-Mosquera, the facts of the
case demonstrate the breadth of prosecution under the DTVIA. Although
it became evident that eventually the semi-submersible vessel might in
fact be used to transport drugs, no drugs were ever detected-scuttled or
on board. The defendants were prosecuted exclusively for operating a
stateless vessel in international waters with the intent to evade detection.
3. UNITED STATES V. CAMPAZ-GUERRERO
Similarly, in United States v. Campaz-Guerrero, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit addressed constitutional challenges to the DTVIA.' 012 In that case,
the defendants were detected in a semi-submersible vessel on December
31, 2008, about 195 miles off the coast of Ecuador. 103 The crewmembers
were pulled out of the Pacific after sinking the vessel, and were trans-
ported to the United States for prosecution."° The four defendants were
charged with one count of conspiring to operate a semi-submersible ves-
sel and a second count of aiding and abetting in the operation of a semi-
submersible vessel in violation of the DTVIA.I°5 Again, the defendants'
challenges to the statute and the associated sentences were struck down
by the Eleventh Circuit, citing Ibarguen-Mosquera and Saac.'1 6 Like the
defendants in Valarezo-Orobio, the Campaz-Guerrero defendants were
not found to be transporting drugs at the time of the seizure.
C. Challenges that the DTVIA Exceeds Congressional Power and
Principles of International Law
In United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquero, the first challenge
addressed congressional power under Article I, section 8 of the Constitu-
tion, which grants Congress the authority to "define and punish Piracies
and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law
of Nations."'0 7 This clause has been interpreted to give Congress broad
authority in punishing criminal offenses outside United States territory.
Relying on Supreme Court jurisprudence related to Article I, section 8 to
analyze whether the DTVIA is legally given extraterritorial effect, the
Eleventh Circuit conducted a two-step analysis. First, Congress must
102. 424 F. App'x 898 (11th Cir. 2011).
103. Id. at 900. The court deems this area to be international waters, although Ecuador claims
its territorial waters to include the area within 200 nautical miles of its coastline. It is unclear
exactly where the ship was stopped, or the reason why these were considered international waters.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 902-04.
107. United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370, 1378 (11 th Cir. 2011); see also U.S.
CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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intend the law to have extraterritorial effect,'08 which is clearly satisfied
by the DTVIA's statement of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 9 Second, the
law must comport with due process in that it may not be arbitrary or
fundamentally unfair."10
1. DUE PROCESS AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
In making a determination as to whether a law to be applied extra-
territorially comports with due process, appellate courts typically consult
international law principles. These principles include the objective prin-
ciple, the protective principle, the universal principle, and the territorial
principle.1 ' Under the territorial principle, a state has jurisdiction to pre-
scribe and enforce a rule of law in the territory of another state to the
extent provided by international agreement with the other state.' 2 Under
the protective principle, a nation may assert jurisdiction over a person
whose extraterritorial activity threatens the nation's security." '3 The pro-
tective principle typically is used only to apply to conduct generally rec-
ognized among nations as a crime."1 4 Similarly, under the universal
principle, a nation may legislate to define and punish conduct considered
to be of universal concern or universally condemned." 5 Finally, under
the objective principle, a nation may criminalize conduct extraterritori-
ally if there is a nexus between that conduct and the nation." 6
2. PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED TO
STATELESS VESSELS
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendants' argument that the
DTVIA does not comport with due process because it fails to meet both
the nexus requirement from the objective principle, and the requirement
that the crime be universally condemned from the protective princi-
108. lbarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1378 (citing United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155
(1933)).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 2285(c) (Supp. 1 2008) ("There is extraterritorial jurisdiction over an offense
under this section ....").
110. lbarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1378 (citing United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548,
553 (1st Cir. 1999)).
111. Id.
112. Cardales, 168 F.3d at 553 (citing United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.
1988)).
113. Id.; see also Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234-35 (1804) (stating that a
nation's "power to secure itself from injury may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its
territory").
114. Id.
115. United States v. Saac, 632 F.3d 1203, 1210 (1 1th Cir. 2011).
116. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1379.
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ple.' 1 7 Relying on its analysis in United States v. Marino-Garcia,"8 the
court asserted that these international law principles apply only to gov-
ern flagged vessels and have no applicability to stateless vessels.' 9
Because the court concluded that international law permits any nation to
subject stateless vessels on the high seas to its jurisdiction, the court
found that the DTVIA comports with international law and is thus not
arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. 2 0 Again, relying on Marino-Garcia,
the court explained that international "law permits any nation to subject
stateless vessels on the high seas to its jurisdiction. . . . Jurisdiction
exists solely as a consequence of the vessel's status as stateless." 121
Alternatively, in United States v. Saac, the Eleventh Circuit found
that the DTVIA does nonetheless comport with these principles. 122 The
court explained that the DTVIA satisfies the universal principle because
Congress' findings show that the DTVIA targets criminal conduct that
facilitates drug trafficking, which is condemned universally by law-abid-
ing nations. 23 There, the court relied on the reasoning of the Third Cir-
cuit in making such a determination.1 24 Based on the same congressional
findings, the Eleventh Circuit found that the DTVIA satisfied the protec-
tive principle, explaining that those "who engage in conduct the DTVIA
targets threaten our nation's security by evading detection while using
submersible vessels to smuggle illegal drugs or other contraband, such
as illegal weapons, from one country to another, and often into the
United States.' 25
The Eleventh Circuit's reasoning is problematic for several reasons.
First, the court's analysis of the DTVIA relies on interpretations of pred-
ecessor drug trafficking statutes. These previous interpretations rely on
the Convention on the High Seas, which is no longer in force and was
superseded by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS"). Ignoring that point, it is important to note that, although
the Convention on the High Seas does not grant rights to stateless ves-
sels on the high seas, it does not subject them automatically to the juris-
117. Id.
118. United States v. Marino-Garcia, 670 F.2d 1373, 1373 (11 th Cir. 1982).
119. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1379; see also United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320,
1324 (11 th Cir. 2003) ("Because stateless vessels do not fall within the veil of another sovereign's
territorial protection, all nations can treat them as their own territory and subject them to their
laws.").
120. Id.
121. Id. (citing Marino-Garcia, 670 F.2d at 1383).
122. United States v. Saac, 632 F.3d 1203, 1211 (11 th Cir. 2011).
123. Id.
124. See United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1993); see also United
States v. Estupinan, 453 F.3d 1336 (11 th Cir. 2006).
125. Saac, 632 F.3d at 1211.
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diction of all nations. In fact, the former Convention explicitly promotes
freedom of the seas principles.' 26 UNCLOS similarly promotes notions
of freedom of the seas, including, in particular, freedom of navigation.
1 27
Although the United States never officially signed on to UNCLOS,
President Reagan announced that the United States would adhere to the
treaty nonetheless. President Reagan declined to sign the treaty because
of disagreements with certain deep seabed mining provisions that he
claimed were "contrary to the principles of industrialized nations and
would not help attain the aspirations of developing countries."1 28 How-
ever, President Reagan went on to explain that the United States was
"prepared to accept and act in accordance with the balance of interests
relating to traditional uses of the oceans." 129 He announced that the
United States would "exercise and assert its navigation and overflight
rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent
with the balance of interests reflected in the convention."' 3 ° President
Reagan explained that the United States would make efforts to work
with other countries to develop an acceptable deep seabed regime.
13 1
Essentially, instead of formally signing on to UNCLOS because of res-
ervations with one part of the treaty, President Reagan informally
adopted a policy of adhering to the Convention's other parts.
126. Article 2 of the Convention of the High Seas provides,
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject any
part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the
conditions laid down by these articles and by the other rules of international law...
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of
international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the
interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.
127. The language from Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas, supra note 126, is
adopted with modifications into Articles 87 and 89 of UNCLOS, which provide,
Article 87. Freedom of the High Seas:
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked.
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by
this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter
alia, both for coastal and land-locked States:
(a) freedom of navigation ...
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the
interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas,
and also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with respect
to activities in the Area.
Article 89. Invalidity of claims of sovereignty over the high seas:
No state may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its
sovereignty.
128. Statement by the President on United States Ocean Policy, 19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc.
383 (Mar. 10, 1983).
129. Id.
130. Id. In the same statement, President Reagan made an announcement defining the
Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States to be within 200 nautical miles of its coast.
131. Id. at 384.
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Since Reagan's policy pronouncement, UNCLOS has been a con-
tested issue among interested parties in the United States. The Obama
administration is pushing for Congress to ratify the thirty-year-old
treaty. 132 The United States is the only major industrialized nation that
has failed to do so. 1 33 Supporters of the treaty also include the United
States military and others who think ratification is necessary for the
United States to maintain its position as the world's leading maritime
power. 134 Although the United States has not yet ratified the treaty, it
has long maintained a policy of generally abiding by its strictures, and
thus the courts should acknowledge UNCLOS and its principles in ana-
lyzing the DTVIA.
3. DEPARTURE FROM JURISDICTIONAL APPLICATIONS OF
PREDECESSOR STATUTES
In applying prior statutes asserting United States criminal jurisdic-
tion on the high seas, courts typically required that there be a nexus
between a vessel and the United States, or that the illicit activity be a
universally recognized crime condemned by all law-abiding nations.
Courts have often liberally construed the nexus requirement, with juris-
diction satisfied if the activity would have any eventual effect on the
United States. The DTVIA, however, eliminates this requirement
entirely, which is a departure from previously-imposed jurisdictional
requirements. 135
The DTVIA lowers the threshold for jurisdiction, creating a new
crime of simply being a stateless vessel intending to evade detection on
the high seas. Jurisdiction over such a crime would be proper without a
nexus requirement if being a stateless vessel were an internationally con-
demned activity. The court offers little to no support for the assertion
that such conduct is universally condemned.136 Article 108 of UNCLOS
132. Lauren Morello, U.S. Pushes for Law of the Sea Ratification as New Arctic Mapping




134. Thad Allen et al., Odd Man Out at Sea, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24 2011), http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/04/25/opinion/25allen.html ? r=1 &ref=thadwallen.
135. For an argument that imposing a statutory nexus requirement would actually strengthen
United States drug trafficking interdiction efforts, see Arthur J. Cook III, Drug Trafficking on the
High Seas: How Consolidation of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act and the Drug
Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act and a Statutory Nexus Requirement Will Improve the War on
Maritime Drug Trafficking, 10 Loy. MAR. L.J. 493 (2012); see also John O'Neil Sheehy, False
Perceptions on Limitation: Why Imposing a Nexus Requirement Under the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act Would Not Significantly Discourage Efforts to Prosecute Maritime Drug
Trafficking, 43 CoNN. L. REV. 1677 (2011).
136. See United States v. Saac, 632 F.3d 1203, 1203 (11 th Cir. 2011); see also United States v.
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does provide for the cooperation among nations for the suppression of
illicit narcotics trafficking, but it is arguable whether this provision is
adequate for the assertion that drug trafficking is universally condemned
among all law-abiding nations. 137 Regardless, all associated activities
that could potentially aid in drug trafficking, such as the act of sailing a
flagless vessel, are not universally recognized as crimes.
Article 110 of UNCLOS allows any state to approach and board a
vessel suspected of being stateless.' 38 There is no such provision in the
Convention on the High Seas. This disparity provides some support for
the notion that the new treaty, which illustrates principles of interna-
tional law, condemns stateless vessels. However, this provision does not
mention going beyond boarding the vessel, leaving open the question of
whether the stateless vessel may be seized as provided for in the
DTVIA. There are two prevailing interpretations to this question. 139 As
previously explained, the courts of the United States and the United
Kingdom take the approach that stateless vessels are afforded no rights
on the high seas. Under this approach, stateless vessels may be boarded
and seized based solely on their stateless status. A second approach is an
adoption of the nexus requirement between a nation and the criminal
activity. For example, under UNCLOS a nexus exists between all states
in relation to piracy.1 40 The United States adopted this approach in rela-
Estupinan, 453 F.3d 1336 (1 1th Cir. 2006); United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052 (3d
Cir. 1993). For a more detailed criticism of treating the operation of stateless vessels as a universal
crime or as a basis for universal jurisdiction, see Allyson Bennett, That Sinking Feeling: Stateless
Ships, Universal Jurisdiction, and the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act, 37 YALE J. INT'L
L. 433 (2012).
137. See generally articles cited, supra note 135, and UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 108., para.
1. This section provides,
1. All States shall cooperate in the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances engaged in by ships on the high seas contrary to
international conventions.
138. UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 110. para. 1. This section provides,
1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a
warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other than a ship
entitled to complete immunity in accordance with articles 95 and 96, is not
justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that:
(a) the ship is engaged in piracy;
(b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade;
(c) the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of the
warship has jurisdiction under article 109;
(d) the ship is without nationality; or
(e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in
reality, of the same nationality as the warship.
139. See generally Douglas Guilfoyle, Maritime Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
12 J. CoaFLiCr & SECuRiTy L. 9 (2007).
140. R. R. CHURCHILL & A. V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 214 (3d ed. 1999).
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tion to drug trafficking under the MDLEA. 141 With the enactment of the
DTVIA, however, the United States moves entirely to the first approach,
adopting general jurisdiction over stateless vessels on the high seas.
It is unclear which of the two approaches for seizures most com-
ports with principles of international law. The inclusion in UNCLOS
and not the Convention on the High Seas of a right to board stateless
vessels demonstrates that the issue was at least subject to increased
attention in treaty discussions. UNCLOS seems to take a harsher stance
toward stateless vessels, which would again give support to the Eleventh
Circuit's approach to DTVIA seizures. On the other hand, the topic of
seizure is notably absent from Article 110 of UNCLOS. The provision
simply addresses boarding to investigate the activity of the stateless ves-
sel.142 If seizure of a stateless vessel were as internationally accepted as
boarding to investigate, it would seem curious that such a right was
omitted from the treaty. This omission raises doubts about the broad
contention of the Eleventh Circuit that stateless vessels are so interna-
tionally condemned as to have no rights whatsoever under international
law.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS OF THE DTVIA
The effects of drug trafficking on the United States are undoubtedly
destructive. For years, the federal government has tried to deter illicit
narcotics activity with varying methods. Drug cartels continue to create
innovative ways to circumvent criminal prosecution. With the increased
use of flagless semi-submersible vessels, prior narcotics laws have
proven inadequate to combat the transport of drugs on these vessels.
Congress is faced with a difficult task in enacting laws to prosecute drug
offenses when these self-propelled semi-submersible vessels are engi-
neered to so quickly eliminate possession of any contraband. Thus, pros-
ecuting the operators of stateless semi-submersible vessels, whether or
not in possession of any drugs, is certainly one logical way of reaching
the drug cartels. However, this approach is overbroad. It may reach the
conduct of those who are truly unrelated to any wrongdoing. Take the
simple situation of an engineer contracted to build a self-propelled semi-
submersible vessel. The engineer has no reason to believe that the buyer
of the vessel is intending to use the vessel for any wrongdoing or that the
buyer is in any way involved in drug trafficking. Perhaps the engineer is
even told the vessel is to be used by government intelligence agencies
141. Id.
142. If possession or recent possession of contraband were still required, boarding to
investigate would presumably lead to a lawful seizure. However, this disparity again highlights the
issue of seizing stateless vessels for the mere act of being stateless.
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and therefore should not be registered or marked. Suppose further that
this engineer takes the vessel on a test drive in deep waters during an
early stage of construction before handing over the vessel to the buyer
and is then prosecuted under the DTVIA. While the situation may be
unlikely to arise, it hardly seems reasonable that the unknowing engineer
should be brought to the United States for criminal prosecution, let alone
that he be sentenced to the same penalty as a drug trafficker.
Beyond this danger, and perhaps more troublesome, the DTVIA
broadens the United States' international police power. For example, the
United States could rely on the DTVIA to capture unregistered fishing
vessels not just in its own protected areas, but anywhere on the high seas
making itself an international fish and wildlife enforcement agency. By
asserting jurisdiction over all stateless vessels evading detection on the
high seas anywhere in the world, any constraints on United States juris-
diction internationally are quickly eroded. The statute is reactive,
designed to combat an immediate and short-term problem the United
States is facing. But the statute will be on the books for much longer and
could be used to justify much broader reaches of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion. By continually asserting that the DTVIA is not a drug- trafficking
statute, the applications of the statute become even more expansive for
the future.
In the end, stateless vessels are not granted many positive rights,
but being a stateless vessel is not an internationally recognized crime.
By eliminating the nexus requirement and creating a new crime under
the DTVIA, the United States has essentially granted itself jurisdiction
over all stateless semi-submersible and submersible vessels on the high
seas, whether or not they are carrying illicit substances or engaging in
otherwise illicit conduct. By ignoring international law principles and
stretching jurisdictional bounds in permitting seizures of stateless ves-
sels, the DTVIA presents an overzealous expansion of United States
jurisdiction on the high seas.
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